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A "UNIFORM AND ENTIRE" 
CONSTITUTION; OR, WHAT IF 
MADISON HAD WON? 
Edward Hartnett* 
James Madison is widely regarded as the father of both the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 1 Yet the constitution-plus-
bill-of-rights that we know today differs in significant ways from 
what Madison proposed to the First Congress in June of 1789. 
For example, he proposed an explicit recognition of popular 
sovereignty,2 a protection of the rights of conscience, freedom of 
the press, and criminal jury trial against state infringement,3 a 
requirement of "unanimity for conviction" and "the right of 
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law. Akhil Amar, John 
Jacobi, Daniel Meltzer, John Copeland Nagle, James Pfander, Suzanna Sherry, and Mi-
chael Zimmer contributed insightful comments on earlier drafts. Jerome Jabbour pro-
vided valuable research assistance. Copyright 1997. All rights reserved. 
1. See, e.g., Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800 
(Hobbs-Merrill, 1950); Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling, and Charlene Bangs Bick-
ford, eds., Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal 
Congress xvi (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1991) ("Documentary Record") ("Madison has a 
greater claim to being known as the father of the Bill of Rights than of the Constitu-
tion"); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Con-
stitution 330 (A.A. Knopf, 1996) ("were it not for Madison, a bill of rights might never 
have been added to the Constitution."). 
2. Madison proposed that the following declaration of popular sovereignty be 
prefixed to the constitution: 
That all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from the peo-
ple. 
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the 
people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of ac-
quiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness 
and safety. 
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to re-
form or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate 
to the purposes of its institution. 
Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 11 (cited in 
note 1). While this prefix did not make it through the House, the idea was reflected in 
the addition of the phrase "or to the people," to what ultimately became the Tenth 
Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 
145 (describing link between popular sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment) (forth-
coming Yale U. Press, 1998). 
3. Documentary Record at 13 (cited in note 1) ("No state shall violate the equal 
rights of conscience, or the freedom of the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."). 
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challenge" in federal criminal jury trials, 4 and an express state-
ment of separation of powers. In all of these areas, Madison 
lost. While our constitutional history might have been quite dif-
ferent if Madison had won on these issues, this Article does not 
seek to revisit Madison's substantive losses. Instead, it explores 
what our Constitution might look like if Madison had won on 
another issue he lost in that first Congress: Madison argued that 
amendments should be interlineated into the body of the Consti-
tution, but the House of Representatives decided instead to at-
tach amendments as supplements to the Constitution. 
This Article proceeds in three steps. First, it recounts the 
debate in the first Congress over the form that amendments to 
the Constitution would take and Madison's loss on that issue. 
Second, it analyzes each of the twenty-seven amendments to the 
Constitution to determine the form they would take in the Con-
stitution if Madison had prevailed on the issue in the first Con-
gress. Finally, it presents a complete text of what our Constitu-
tion would look like if Madison had prevailed. 
I. THE DEBATE IN THE FIRST CONGRESS 
When Madison proposed his amendments to the Constitu-
tion, he sought to integrate them into the body of the Constitu-
tion so as to preserve what he considered the "uniform and en-
tire" system of the Constitution.6 He proposed that the 
recognition of popular sovereignty be "prefixed to the constitu-
tion,"7 and that a bar on changes in Congressional compensation 
from taking effect before an intervening election be "added to 
the end of the first sentence" in Article I, section 6, clause 1.8 
Similarly, he proposed that the bulk of what we now call the Bill 
of Rights "be inserted" in Article I, section 9, "between clauses 
3 and 4,"9 and that his suggested additional restrictions on the 
4. Id. at 13 ("The trial of all crimes ... shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders 
of the vicinage, with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, 
and other accustomed requisites."). 
S. Id. at 14 ("The powers delegated by this constitution, and appropriated to the 
departments to which they are respectively distributed: so that the legislative depart-
ment shall never exercise the powers vested in the executive or judicial; nor the execu-
tive exercise the powers vested in the legislative or judicial; nor the judicial exercise the 
powers vested in the legislative or executive departments."). 
6. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 118 (cited in note 1). 
7. Madison Resolution, June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 11 
(cited in note 1 ). 
8. Documentary Record at 12 (cited in note 1). 
9. Id. 
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states "be inserted" in Article I, section 10, "between clauses 1 
and 2."10 In addition, he proposed "the third clause" in Article 
III, section 2 "be struck out, and in its place be inserted" a new 
provision governing jury trials in criminal cases, grand jury in-
dictments, and jury trials in civil cases.11 
Madison's proposal was referred to a select committee con-
sisting of one representative from each of the eleven states that 
had, at that point, ratified the Constitution.12 Although the se-
lect committee report differed in some respects from Madison's 
original proposal, it followed his lead in proposing that the 
amendments be incorporated into the body of the Constitution.13 
On August 13, 1789, the House of Representatives, sitting as a 
committee of the whole, began to debate the report of the select 
committee. Roger Sherman, a "consistent opponent of a Bill of 
Rights," 14 immediately objected that "this is not the proper 
mode of amending the constitution. "15 He argued: 
We ought not to interweave our propositions into the work it-
self, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric. We 
might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to in-
corporate such heterogeneous articles; the one contradictory 
to the other.16 
10. ld. at 13. See also The Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, reprinted in 
Documentary Record at 85 (cited in note 1) ("I wish also, in revising the constitution, we 
may throw into that section, which interdicts the abuse of certain powers in the state 
legislatures, some other provisions of equal if not greater importance than those already 
made.") (statement of Madison). 
11. Documentary Record at 13 (cited in note 1 ). 
12. The Congressional Register, July 21, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 
102-03 (cited in note 1). North Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet ratified the con-
stitution and "[o]ne of Madison's major objectives was to 'bring in' North Carolina." 
David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 
J. L. & Pol. 1, 54 (1987). "[M]ost Federalists were indifferent" to the fate of Rhode Is-
land. Rakove, Original Meanings at 125 (cited in note 1). 
13. House Committee Report, July 28, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 
29-33 (cited in note 1 ). 
14. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 1050 (Chelsea 
House, 1971). As a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, Sherman opposed a mo-
tion to appoint a committee to draft a federal bill of rights. John P. Kaminski, Restoring 
the Grand Security: The Debate Over a Federal Bill of Rights, 1787-1792, 33 Santa Clara 
L. Rev. 887,890 (1993). 
This was not, of course, the first time that Sherman and Madison had disagreed 
about the making of the Constitution. To the contrary, "it was the rivalry between their 
competing goals and political styles that jointly gave the Great Convention much of its 
drama and fascination-and also permitted its achievement." Rakove, Original Mean-
ings at 92 (cited in note 1 ). 
15. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 117 (cited in note 1 ). 
16. Id.; see also Letter from Roger Sherman to Henry Gibbs, Aug. 4, 1789, re-
printed in Documentary Record at 271 (cited in note 1) ("I don't like the form in which 
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Sherman contended that the "absurdity" of amending 
Madison's way was demonstrated by comparing it to statutory 
amendments, asking whether "any Legislature [would] endeavor 
to introduce into a former act, a subsequent amendment, and let 
them stand so connected. "17 Sherman questioned the legitimacy 
of Madison's approach, arguing that the constitution is the "act 
of the people" while the amendments "will be the act of the 
state governments," and suggesting that Madison's approach 
would be the equivalent of "destroy[ing] the whole and estab-
lish[ing] a new constitution," thereby "remov[ing] the basis on 
which we mean to build. "18 He therefore moved that amend-
ments be added as supplements to the Constitution.19 
Supporters of Sherman's motion expressed fear that sub-
mitting amendments to the states in the way proposed by Madi-
son would be an attempt to repeal the Constitution, risking "the 
destruction of the whole,"20 and argued that Sherman's supple-
mental approach would permit "the world [to] discover the per-
fection of the original, and the superfluity of the amendments."21 
Moving from weak arguments to fanciful ones, they even argued 
that "[i]f the amendments are incorporated in the body of the 
work, it will appear, unless we refer to the archives of congress, 
that George Washington, and the other worthy characters who 
composed the convention, signed an instrument which they 
never had in contemplation. "22 
Madison responded: 
Form, sir, is always of less importance than the substance; but 
on this occasion, I admit that form is of some conse-
quence .... Now it appears to me, that there is a neatness 
and propriety in incorporating the amendments into the con-
stitution itself; in that case the system will remain uniform and 
entire; it will certainly be more simple, when the amendments 
are interwoven into those parts to which they naturally be-
long ... we shall then be able to determine its meaning with-
out references or comparison; whereas, if they are supplemen-
they are reported to be incorporated in the Constitution, that Instrument being the Act 
of the people, ought to be kept intire [sic.]-and amendments made by the Legislatures 
Should be in addition by way of Supplement.") . 
17. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789 reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 117 (cited in note 1). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 117-18; see also id. at 125 ("I contend that amendments made in the way 
proposed by the committee are void") (statement of Sherman). 
20. Id. at 119 (statement of Livermore). 
21. ld. at 120 (statement of Oymer). 
22. I d. (statement of Stone). 
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tary, its meaning can only be ascertained by a comparison of 
the two instruments, which will be a very considerable embar-
rassment, it will be difficult to ascertain to what parts of the 
instrument the amendments particularly refer; they will create 
unfavorable comparisons, whereas if they are placed upon the 
footing here proposed, they will stand upon as good founda-
tion as the original work.23 
John Vining ridiculed Sherman's proposal, noting he had 
once seen an "act entitled an act to amend a supplement to an 
act entitled an act for altering part of act entitled an act for cer-
tain purposes therein mentioned" and that if Sherman's mode 
were adopted, "the system would be distorted, and like a care-
less written letter, have more matter attached to it in a post-
script than was contained in the original composition."24 El-
bridge Gerry confronted directly the suggestion that 
amendments ratified by state legislatures would not "have the 
same authority as the original instrument," and challenged 
Sherman: "if this is his meaning, let him avow it, and if it is well 
founded, we may save ourselves the trouble of proceeding in the 
business" of amendments at all. 25 Egbert Benson, supporting 
Madison's approach, correctly noted that the state conventions 
that ratified the Constitution "had proposed amendments in this 
very form. "26 Madison, who had struggled to have the House 
23. Id. at 118. 
24. Id. at 120 (statement of Vining); see also id. at 122 ("If we proceed in the way 
proposed by (Sherman]. I presume the title of our first amendment will be, a supplement 
to the constitution of the United States; the next a supplement to the supplement, and so 
on, until we have supplements annexed five times in five years, wrapping up the consti-
tution in a maze of perplexity; and as great an( d) adept as that honorable gentlemen is at 
finding out the truth, it will take him, I apprehend, a week or a fortnight's study to ascer-
tain the true meaning of the constitution."). Vining's fear that the postscript would be 
longer than the letter has not come to pass, but we are well on our way: "The roughly 
3,100 words in (the) amendments come fairly close to the 4,300 of the original instru-
ment." David E. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 
1776-1995 at x (U. Press of Kansas, 1996). 
25. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789 reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 127 (cited in note 1) (statement of Gerry). Five days before the adjournment of the 
constitutional convention, Elbridge Gerry proposed that a committee be appointed to 
draft a bill of rights. Rakove, Original Meanings at 288 (cited in note 1). He later re-
fused to sign the Constitution. I d. at 106. Gerry also attended the early sessions of the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention, but "was too eccentric to give Anti-Federalists the 
leadership they conspicuously lacked." Id. at 119. 
26. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789 reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 123 (cited in note 1) (statement of Benson). See, e.g., Amendments Proposed by the 
South Carolina Convention, May 23, 1788, reprinted in Documentary Record at 16 (cited 
in note 1) ("the third section of the Sixth Article ought to be amended by inserting the 
word 'other' between the words 'no' and 'religious."'); Amendments Proposed by the 
New York Convention, July 26, 1788, reprinted in Documentary Record at 28 (cited in 
note 1) ("the words without the Consent of Congress in the seventh Clause of the ninth 
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consider the subject of amendments at all, despaired that if 
Sherman's motion were adopted, "we shall so far unhinge the 
business as to occasion alterations in every article and clause of 
the report. "27 
Madison certainly seems to have had the better of the ar-
gument, and Sherman's motion was defeated. 28 
Less than a week later, on August 19, Sherman renewed his 
motion to add the amendments to the Constitution by way of 
supplement rather than by incorporating them into the body. 29 
The extant record reports only that a debate occurred "similar 
to what took place" on August 13; no details of that debate are 
provided.30 This time, however, Sherman's motion carried, with 
a two-thirds vote in favor. 31 What explains the change? 
During the intervening week, the House of Representatives 
was a rather unpleasant place to be. On August 15, the House, 
again sitting as a committee of the whole, discussed a proposed 
constitutional amendment that neither Madison nor the select 
committee supported, an amendment providing for instruction 
of representatives. During this discussion, Thomas Sumter 
complained of what he considered undue haste in pressing the 
constitutional amendments proposed by the select committee. 
He stated that he was "obliged to notice" this "somewhat im-
proper" conduct. 32 In this same debate, Aedanus Burke de-
scribed the amendments proposed by Madison and the select 
committee as "little better than whip-syllabub, frothy and full of 
wind, formed only to please the palate," and compared them to 
Section of the first Article of the Constitution, be expunged."); Amendments Proposed 
by the Anti-Federalist Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, reprinted in Randy E. 
Barnett, ed., The Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment 373 (George Mason U. Press, 1989) ("That a proviso be added at the end of 
the second clause of the second section of the third article, to the following effect, viz.: 
Provided that such appellate jurisdiction, in all cases of common-law cognizance, be by a 
writ of error, and confined to matters of law only; and that no such writ of/error shall be 
admitted, except in revenue cases, unless the matter in controversy exceed the value of 
three thousand dollars."); Amendments Proposed by the North Carolina Convention, 
reprinted in Barnett, Rights Retained by the People at 369 ("the latter part of the 5th 
paragraph of the 9th section of the 1st article be altered to read thus: 'Nor shall vessels 
bound to a particular state be obliged to enter or pay duties in any other; nor, when 
bound from any one of the states, be obliged to clear in another."'). 
27. Documentary Record at 123 (cited in note 1). 
28. Id. at 128. 
29. The Congressional Register, Aug. 19, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 197 (cited in note 1). 
30. Id. at 198. 
31. Id. 
32. The Congressional Register, Aug. 15, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 174 (cited in note 1 ). 
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a "tub thrown out to a whale, to secure the freight of the ship 
and its peaceable voyage,"33 a common metaphor at the time for 
a diversionary tactic.34 
Madison "was not willing to be silent after the charges that 
had been brought," noting that Sumter and Burke had "insinu-
ate[d] that we are not acting with candor."35 He stated, "If I was 
inclined to make no alteration in the constitution I would bring 
forward such amendments as were of a dubious cast, in order to 
have the whole rejected,"36 thereby insinuating that his oppo-
nents were deliberately proposing amendments that had little 
~rosgect of being enacted in order to undermine the constitu-
tiOn. 
Writing on August 15, William Smith stated, "there has 
been more ill-humour & rudeness displayed today than has ex-
isted since the meeting of Congress," and "to make it worse, the 
weather is intensely hot. "38 Later that week, tempers grew so 
hot that the House saw "the first known instance of congress-
men challenging each other to duels."39 
33. Id. at 175. 
34. See Documentary Record at 175 n.26 (cited in note 1); Kenneth R. Bowling, "A 
Tub to the Whale,": The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, in Patrick T. Conley and John P. 
Kaminski, eds., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Colonial and Revolutionary Origins 
of American Liberties 47 (Madison House, 1992) ("In 1704 Jonathan Swift had written in 
Tale of a Tub that 'seamen have a custom, when they meet a whale, to fling him out an 
empty tub by way of amusement, to divert him from laying violent hands upon the 
ship."'). 
35. Documentary Record at 176 (cited in note 1 ). 
36. Id. 
37. See also Letter from James Madison to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789, re-
printed in Documentary Record at 281-82 (cited in note 1) (antifederalists would "blow 
the Trumpet for a second Convention" if the amendments were not enacted); Letter 
from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, Aug. 21, 1789, reprinted in Documentary 
Record at 284 (cited in note 1) ("dilatory artifices of which some of the antifederal 
members are suspected"); Letter from Frederick A. Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush, 
Aug. 18, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 280-81 (cited in note 1) ("It is a 
strange yet certain Fact, that those who have heretofore been & still profess to be the 
greatest Sticklers for Amendments ... have hitherto thrown every Obstacle they could 
in their way ... but it is obvious their Design was to favour their darling Question for 
calling a Convention"). 
38. Letter from William L. Smith to Edward Rutledge, Aug. 15, 1789, reprinted in 
Documentary Record at 278 (cited in note 1). See also Letter from Thomas Hartley to 
Jasper Yeates, Aug. 16, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 279 (cited in note 1) 
("We had Yesterday warm debates about amendments."); Letter from George Leonard 
to Sylvanus Bourne, Aug. 16, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 279 (cited in 
note 1) ("For three days past the proposed amendments have been under Consideration, 
the Political Thermometer high Each day."). 
39. Documentary Record at xv (cited in note 1); see also Letter from William 
Smith to Ortho H. Williams, Aug. 22, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 285 
(cited in note 1) (observing that "the greatest objections arose from those opposed to 
the constitution, very high words passed in t~e house on this occasion, & what nearly 
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In the midst of this discord, Madison concluded that it 
was "absolutely necessary in order to effect any thing to abbre-
viate debate, and exclude every proposition of a doubtful & 
unimportant nature."40 One of the things that Madison gave up 
was his favored form of amendment.41 He explained: 
It became an unavoidable sacrifice to a few who knew their 
concurrence to be necessary, to the despatch if not the success 
of the business, to give up the form by which the amendts. 
when ratified would have fallen into the body of the Constitu-
tion, in favor of the project of adding them by way of appen-
dix to it. 42 
While Madison sacrificed on this issue, he was not happy 
with the result, noting that "it is already apparent ... that some 
ambiguities will be produced by this change, as the question will 
often arise and sometimes be not easily solved, how far the 
original text is or is not necessarily superceded, by the supple-
mental act."43 But suppose Madison had not found it necessary 
to make this sacrifice to "a few" in the overheated environment 
of August 1789. What would our Constitution look like? 
II. A MADISONIAN APPROACH TO THE TWENTY-
SEVEN AMENDMENTS 
THE FIRST TEN AMENDMENTS: A VOIDING AMBIGUITY AND 
PRODUCING A BETTER BILL OF RIGHTS 
Integrating the first ten amendments into the body of the 
Constitution is relatively easy because Madison already did most 
of the work. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and 
amount to direct challenges, the weather was excessive hot, & the blood warm," but that 
once there was a "change in the Air," tempers calmed). 
40. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, Aug. 21, 1789, reprinted in 
Documentary Record at 284 (cited in note 1). Sherman had noted that those whoop-
posed his motion thought it a matter of form, while he contended that it was a matter of 
substance, and argued that if the supporters of the amendments were "so desirous of 
having the business compleated, they had better sacrifice what they consider but a mat-
ter of indifference to get gentlemen to go more unanimously along with them in altering 
the constitution." Documentary Record at 128 (cited in note 1). 
41. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale,": The Adoption of the Bill of Rights at 53 (cited 
in note 34) ("In securing Federalist votes to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority, 
Madison paid a two-part price: the House voted out the little that remained of his pre-
amble, and it agreed to Sherman's motion that the amendments be placed at the end of 
the Constitution."). 
42. Letter from James Madison to Alexander White, Aug. 24, 1789, reprinted in 
Documentary Record at 287 (cited in note 1) (emphasis in original). 
43. Id. at 287-88. 
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Ninth Amendments belong in Article I, section 9, along with the 
other explicit limitations on Congressional power.44 The Sev-
enth and Tenth Amendments are also easy to integrate into the 
text in accordance with Madison's plan. Madison proposed that 
the right to a civil jury trial and the prohibition of reexamina-
tion of facts tried to a jury, except in accordance with the princi-
ples of common law, be included in Article III, section 2.45 What 
became the Tenth Amendment, by contrast, was proposed as a 
separate article, a new Article VII, with the original Article VII 
renumbered as Article VIII.46 Although these provisions 
emerged from Congress somewhat changed from Madison's 
original proposal, the language of these amendments as ulti-
mately enacted can readily be inserted just where Madison 
wanted them.47 
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are somewhat more diffi-
cult to integrate because of the way they were altered in the 
legislative process. Indeed, it seems likely that these were the 
amendments Madison had in mind when he wrote that he al-
ready saw ambiguities in the relationship between the main 
body of the Constitution and the appended amendments.48 Arti-
cle III of the original Constitution guaranteed a jury trial of all 
crimes (except in cases of impeachment), and guaranteed that 
the trial be held in the state where the crime was committed, 
leaving to Congress to decide the place of trial for crimes not 
committed in any state.49 In response to complaints that this did 
not adequately protect a right to a local jury, Madison proposed 
that this provision of the original Constitution be replaced by a 
new provision that guaranteed both a jury from the vicinage 
(except in cases of impeachment and cases in the military) and a 
grand jury indictment (except in certain extraordinary circum-
44. See Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 
12-13 (cited in note 1) (proposing bar on establishment of national religion; freedoms of 
religion, conscience, speech, assembly, petition, and bearing arms; limit on quartering of 
soldiers; bar on excessive bail, excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, and unrea-
sonable searches and seizures; and that particular rights not be construed to diminish 
other retained rights). 
45. ld. at 13. 
46. Id. at 13-14. 
. 47. It is possible, of course, that the changes in language could have led to changes 
m placement as well, but this does not undermine the reasonableness of Madison's 
placement. 
. 48. See Letter from James Madison to Alexander White, Aug. 24, 1789, reprinted 
m Documentary Record at 287-88 (cited in note 1). 
49. U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
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stances), but which let crimes not committed within any county 
be tried where the laws prescribe.50 
Madison's proposal also contained other provisions that ul-
timately found their way into the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 
He proposed banning multiple punishments or trials for the 
same offense, compelled self-incrimination, deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property without due process, and relinquishment of 
property without just compensation. 51 He also proposed that the 
accused in criminal prosecutions have the right to a speedy and 
public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accu-
sation, and to be confronted with his accusers and witnesses, to 
have compulsory process, and to have the assistance of counsel. 52 
All of these protections were to be inserted in Article I, section 
9. 
Thus, under Madison's approach, the provisions of both the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments would be split up. The grand jury 
right of the Fifth Amendment and the criminal jury trial right of 
the Sixth Amendment would be placed in Article III, replacing 
the less detailed jury trial right originally protected in Article 
III. The other rights of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would 
50. The trial of all crimes (except in cases of impeachments, and cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or the militia when on actual service in time of war, 
or public danger,) shall be by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, 
with the requisite of unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and 
other accustomed requisites; and in all crimes punishable with loss of life or 
member, presentment or indictment by a grand jury, shall be an essential pre-
liminary, provided that in cases of crimes committed within any county which 
may be in possession of an enemy, or in which a general insurrection may pre-
vail, the trial may by law be authorised in some other county of the same state, 
as near as may be to the seat of the offence. 
In cases of crimes committed not within any county, the trial may by law 
be in such county as the laws shall have prescribed. In suits at common law be-
tween man and man, the trial by jury as one of the best securities to the rights of 
the people, ought to remain inviolate. 
Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 13 (cited in 
note 1). 
51. No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than 
one punishment, or one trial for the same offence; nor shall be compelled to be 
a witness against himself: nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; nor be obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be 
necessary for public use, without a just compensation. 
Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 12 (cited in 
note 1). 
52. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation, to be 
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him; to have a compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 13 (cited in 
note 1). 
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be placed in Article I, section 9, along with the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments. 
Madison's approach would have eliminated ambiguities in 
the relationship between Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and 
the Sixth Amendment. For example, Article III requires a jury 
trial for all crimes, except in cases of impeachment; the Sixth 
Amendment, by contrast, repeats the requirement of a jury trial 
in all criminal prosecutions, but has no impeachment exception. 
Article III requires that trial take place in the state where the 
crime was committed, unless the crime was not committed in 
any state, in which case Congress can direct the place of trial; 
the Sixth Amendment requires a jury of the state and district 
where the crime was committed, but makes no provision for 
crimes that do not occur in any state. The Fifth Amendment's 
grand jury requirement has an exception for military cases; the 
Sixth Amendment's jury trial requirement does not. Under our 
Shermanesque constitution, the courts have been left to puzzle 
out these problems.53 If Madison's approach had prevailed, 
these problems would likely have been avoided by clear textual 
statements in Article III. 
The received wisdom is that "Americans owe to Sherman, 
who was actually an opponent of amending the Constitution, the 
existence of a separate group of Amendments known as the Bill 
of Rights."54 Herbert Storing, for example, wrote: 
Ironically, the result seems to have been exactly the opposite 
of what Sherman intended, and yet to have gone beyond what 
Madison wanted. Separate listing of the first ten amendments 
has elevated rather than weakened their status. 55 
53. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 181-82 (1891) (sixth amendment 
leaves in place the power of Congress to provide for the location of trial for crimes not 
committed within any state); Ex parte Richard Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942) (cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces are "expressly excepted from the Fifth Amendment, and 
are deemed excepted by implication from the Sixth."); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 
{1866) ("the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by 
jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or pre-
sentment in the fifth."). Cf. Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale 
L.J. 1131, 1196-99 (1991) (arguing that Article III should be construed to require a non-
waivable jury in criminal cases and that nothing in the sixth amendment should trans-
form that mandatory structural requirement into a waivable right belonging to the ac-
cused). 
54. Documentary Record at xv (cited in note 1). 
55. Herbert J. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights, in M. Judd Hannon, 
ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States 47 (Kennikat Press, 1978); cf. Amar, 
Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 344 (cited in note 2) (noting irony that 
"Madison stressed the didactic role that a Bill of Rights could play, yet his original 
planned amendments would have scattered various provisions throughout the original 
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Similarly, Bernard Schwartz has argued that the change 
from Madison's approach to Sherman's approach "was of the 
greatest consequence, for it may be doubted that the Bill of 
Rights itself could have attained its position as the vital center of 
our constitutional law if its provisions were diluted throughout 
the Constitution," and that "[p]aradoxically, it is to Sherman 
(himself a consistent opponent of a Bill of Rights) that we owe 
the fact that we have a separate Bill of Rights."56 
Madison's proposal, however, would not have produced less 
significant "scattered protections of individual rights."57 It would 
have, instead, produced a better bill of rights. 
Consider, first, that the bulk of what we now consider the 
bill of rights would have appeared immediately after the protec-
tion of the Great Writ of habeas corpus and immediately before 
the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.58 
These constitutional provisions surely belong on a bill of 
rights- and would have been a part of a Madisonian bill of 
rights-but are not on our Shermanesque bill of rights. Indeed, 
"'Federal Farmer,' the most influential Antifederal pamphlet-
eer, asserted that the Constitution's ninth and tenth sections of 
Article I 'are no more nor less, than a partial bill ofrights."'59 
document.''). 
56. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History at 1121 (cited in note 14); 
see also Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale,": The Adoption of the Bill of Rights at 53 (cited 
in note 34) (Shennan's approach broadened the role of amendments in constitutional 
law and "made it possible to point to a body of amendments known as the Bills of 
Rights"; "It is ironic that credit for this development belongs to a leading opponent of 
the Bill of Rights, Roger Shennan."); Richard B. Bernstein, Amending America: If We 
Love the Constitution So Much, Why Do We Keep Trying to Change It? 43 (Times, 1993) 
("The House's decision, setting amendments aside from the rest of the Constitution, 
would lead to the placement of the Bill of Rights at the head of the post-1787 text of the 
document, thus ensuring its primacy in popular imagination."); Robert A. Goldwin, 
Congressman Madison Proposes Amendments to the Constitution, in Robert A. Licht, 
ed., The Framers and Fundamental Rights 62 (AEI Press, 1992) ("If the House of Repre-
sentatives had gone along with Madison's proposal to insert the new articles in the body 
of the Constitution, it would have been difficult to think of them collectively as a body to 
be called the Bill of Rights, or any other collective name."). 
57. Storing, The Constitution and the Bill of Rights at 47 (cited in note 55). 
58. Cf. Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 344 (cited in note 2) 
(suggesting that "each clause of the early Amendments gains by its proximity to the oth-
ers."). 
59. Kaminski, 33 Santa Clara L. Rev. at 896 (cited in note 14); see also Lawrence 
G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But What 
on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 239,246 (1988) 
("the prohibitions against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder and the suspension of ha-
beas corpus are surely rights-bearing provisions."); Rakove, Original Meanings at 318 
(cited in note 1) ("Some rights, then, were protected in the Constitution, but the list was 
clearly piecemeal in composition and partial in coverage .... The omission left the fram-
ers open to the charge that they had contrived to deprive the people of their fundamen-
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Consider, too, what would not be contained in the Madiso-
nian bill of rights in Article I, section 9, but instead would have 
been left to Article Ill: grand jury indictment and jury trial in 
civil cases. These rights have not been considered sufficiently 
fundamental to the American scheme of justice by the Supreme 
Court of the United States to be included in "due process of 
law."60 
It is true that jury trial in criminal cases would not have 
been included in Madison's bill of rights in Article I, section 9. 
However, Madison thought this right so basic that he wanted to 
include it (along with "equal rights of conscience" and "freedom 
of the press") in Article I, section 10, as a right to be protected 
from state infringement as well as federal infringement.61 On the 
other hand, while the Supreme Court has concluded that the 
right to jury trial in criminal cases is fundamental,62 it is far from 
clear that this determination by the Court has strengthened 
rather than weakened the nature of that right.63 
tal rights."); id. at 320 (noting that after Federalist James Wilson launched the idea that 
inclusion of a bill of rights would be dangerous because it could be construed as implying 
additional powers in the national government, Anti-Federalists "gleefully" pointed out 
that the constitution already contained a "partial bill of rights"). 
Moreover, increased attention to Article I, § 9 might have given the rootless right to 
travel at least a colorable textual home. See U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 6 ("nor shall Ves-
sels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another"); 
cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("freedom to travel throughout the 
United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution," even 
though "that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution."). 
60. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,633 (1972) (due process clause "does 
not require the States to observe the Fifth Amendment's provision for presentment or 
indictment by a grand jury."); Hutardo v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (fifth amend-
ment right to grand jury indictment not applicable to states); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 
189, 192 n.6 (1974) ("The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an 
element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (seventh 
amendment right to civil jury trial not applicable to states). But see Amar, Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 101 (cited in note 2) ("Guaranteed in no Jess than 
three amendments, juries were at the heart of the Bill of Rights."); id. at 116 ("If we 
seek a paradigmatic image underlying the original Bill of Rights, we cannot go far wrong 
in picking the jury."). 
61. See Madison Resolution, June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 13 
(cited in note 1) ("No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of 
the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases."); The Congressional Register, Aug. 17, 
1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 188-89 (cited in note 1) (Madison 
"[c]onceived this to be the most valuable amendment on the whole Jist; if there was any 
reason to restrain the government of the United States from infringing upon these essen-
tial rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against the state govern-
ments."). 
62 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to criminal 
jury trial applicable to states). 
63. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (states may use juries smaller than 
twelve); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (states may use non-unanimous juries). 
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In addition, the Tenth Amendment would not have been in 
the Madisonian bill of rights in Article I, section 9, but instead 
would have stood on its own as a separate article. With the 
Ninth Amendment in the bill of rights and the Tenth Amend-
ment as a separate article of the constitution, it would have been 
harder to forget that there are unenumerated rights and much 
harder to "treat the ninth amendment as a colossally bad first 
draft of the tenth. "64 
There is, concededly, one embarrassing drawback to a 
Madisonian bill of rights in Article I, section 9: Immediately 
prior to that bill of rights-or perhaps (sadly) the first such 
right-is the protection of the slave trade until1808.65 But as we 
shall see shortly, even this drawback can be turned to advantage. 
Madison's approach to constitutional amendment has the re-
deeming virtue of permitting the elimination of such noxious 
prOVISIOnS. 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL 
FOCUS AND REDUCING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR JUDICIAL 
MISCHIEF 
When we turn to the Eleventh Amendment, we leave the 
comfort of Madison's own handiwork and must engage in a 
larger measure of speculation in attempting to integrate the 
amendment into the original text. Compounding the difficulty, 
64. Sager, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 246 (cited in note 64); see also id. at 264 (answer 
to question of "what on earth can you do with the ninth amendment?" is "you can re-
member the ninth amendment"). See generally Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgotten 
Ninth Amendment (Bobbs-Merrill, 1955). My point is not that the ninth amendment is 
only about unenumerated individual rights; I agree that the preamble, ninth, and tenth 
amendments are "at their core about popular sovereignty." Amar, Bill of Rights: Crea-
tion and Reconstruction at 145 (cited in note 2). My point, rather, is that it would be 
easier to see the "triangular interrelation," id., among the three if two of the three were 
not placed right next to each other. 
65. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as 
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the 
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may 
be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."). 
Madison himself wrote in 1785: 
The Constitution may expressly restrain [the legislature] from medling with re-
ligion-from abolishing Juries from taking away the Habeas corpus-from 
forcing a citizen to give evidence against himself, from controuling the press, 
from enacting retrospective laws at least in criminal cases, from abridging the 
right of suffrage, from seizing private property for public use without paying its 
full Valu[e,] from licensing the importation of Slaves, from infringing the Con-
federation, &c &c. 
Rakove, Original Meanings at 313 (cited in note 1) (quoting Letter from Madison to 
Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785)). 
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of course, is the continuing controversy over the meaning of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
As appended to the Constitution, the eleventh amendment 
reads: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.66 
Beginning with its 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana,67 
however, the Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh 
Amendment embodies a concept of state sovereign immunity 
far beyond the amendment's text.68 If this understanding of the 
Eleventh Amendment is correct, a likely place for insertion into 
the body of the constitution is Article IV, section 3, which deals 
with the integrity of the states. Moreover, if this understanding 
of the Eleventh Amendment were written into the text, the ad-
dition to Article IV, section 3 would read something like "Nor 
shall any State be subject to liability in any court of the United 
States without the consent of the Legislature of the State, except 
when sued by the United States or another State." 
A more convincing interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment-one that is more respectful of its text and pre-1890 doc-
trine-is that it simply "eliminated party-based jurisdiction 
when the state was a party defendant, but did not alter the 
states' amenability to suit where jurisdiction was based on sub-
ject matter."69 On this view, a Madisonian approach to constitu-
tional amendment would have integrated the Eleventh Amend-
ment into the text of Article III by altering its party-based 
clauses.70 The resulting text of Article III, section 2 would likely 
read as follows: 
66. U.S. Const., Amend. XI. 
67. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
68. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). See also Wise. Dept. of Corrections v. 
Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) (Eleventh Amendment does "not automatically 
destroy original jurisdiction [but instead] grants the State a legal power to assert a sov-
ereign immunity defense should it choose to do so."); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 Yale L.J. 1683 (1997) (exploring whether the im-
munity is from liability or merely from the jurisdiction of federal trial courts). 
69. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 10; see also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sover-
eign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 (1983). 
70. See Meltzer, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 22 (cited in note 69) ("interlineation of the 
Eleventh Amendment into Article III might well have resulted in a rewriting of Article 
III's party-based clauses"). 
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The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United 
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;- to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;- to Controversies between two or 
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State, 
where the State is plaintiff,-between Citizens of different 
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands 
under Grants of different States, and between a State or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects, ex-
cept where a State is sued by a citizen or subject of any foreign 
state. 
Interestingly, there is one pre-Hans constitution that integrates 
the substance of the Eleventh Amendment into its Article Ill. 
The Constitution of the Confederate States of America pro-
vides: 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the Confederate States; and treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all 
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con-
suls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to 
controversies to which the Confederate States shall be a 
party; to controversies between two or more States; between a 
State and citizens of another State, where the State is plaintiff; 
between citizens claiming lands under grants of different 
States; and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and for-
eign states, citizens or subjects; but no State shall be sued by a 
citizen or subject of any foreign state." 
This is not the place to revisit the extensive literature con-
cerning the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.72 
Yet apparently the framers of the Confederate Constitution-
people obviously far more committed to "state's rights" than the 
Federalist drafters of the Eleventh Amendment-did not view 
the Eleventh Amendment as a statement of state sovereign im-
munity but as a modification to the party-based clauses of Arti-
71. Constitution of the Confederate States of America, Art. III, § 2 (1861), re-
printed in George Anastaplo, The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary 357-
58 (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1995). 
72. For a "brief summary of a complex set of arguments," see Meltzer, 1996 Sup. 
a. Rev. at 12-13 (cited in note 69); for references to those arguments, see id. at 10 
nn.44-45. 
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cle IIC3 This gives powerful support to the view that Hans was 
not the proper interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment but 
rather an inventive solution to a difficult problem facing the Su-
preme Court after the end of Reconstruction: how to gracefully 
avoid issuing judgments requiring southern states to make good 
on bonds issued by their Reconstruction governments when the 
Justices knew that such judgments would not be enforced.74 
However one interprets the Eleventh Amendment, it seems 
unlikely that Madison's approach to constitutional amendment 
would have resulted in simply adding the words of what now ap-
pears in the Eleventh Amendment to the end of Article Ill, sec-
tion 2. That is, a Madisonian would be unlikely to draft an 
amendment describing how Article Ill, section 2, should be con-
strued.75 Instead, under Madison's approach it would have been 
more likely that Congress would have focused explicitly on 
whether it was constitutionalizing state sovereign immunity or 
modifying the party-based heads of federal jurisdiction. Such an 
explicit focus would narrow the opportunities for mischievous 
judicial interpretation of constitutional language. 
THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: ELIMINATING CONFUSING 
SURPLUSAGE 
The Twelfth Amendment is quite easy to integrate into the 
body of the Constitution. It changed the method of presidential 
election from that described in Article II, section 1-whereby 
the electors in each state voted for two persons, with the overall 
winner being president and the runner-up vice-president-to 
one in which the electors in each state vote separately for presi-
73. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1482 n.232 
(citing the Confederate Constitution and noting that "the Confederates chose language 
that simply limited two party-defined jurisdictional categories without in any way es-
tablishing the general 'sovereign immunity' of states, or ousting federal question and 
admiralty jurisdiction-exactly the same result as the Eleventh Amendment of the Fed-
eralist Constitution, properly read."). 
. 74. See Gi~bons, 83 Colum. L. Rev. at 1973-2004 (cited in note 69) (recounting the 
history of repudiation, the end of reconstruction, and the Court's capitulation); id. at 
2004 (noting that Hans "can be viewed as a statesmanlike performance" in that the 
"Court's circuitous path through the sovereign immunity question left ample room 
for ... remedial decisions, while avoiding a potentially disastrous confrontation with the 
states in which the Court could not count on support from the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government."). 
75. But see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Ac-
count of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 Com. L. Rev. 1269 (1998) (arguing that the Elev-
enth Amendment was phrased as an explanation of Article III in order to secure its ap-
plication to then-pending cases). 
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dent and vice-president.76 Under Madison's approach to consti-
tutional amendment, the provisions of Article II, section 1 de-
scribing the role of presidential electors would be eliminated 
and the text of the Twelfth Amendment substituted in its place. 
Under our Shermanesque Constitution, a citizen interested 
in learning how the president is elected would begin by reading 
Article II, section 1. There she would read that the president 
"shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, to-
gether with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be 
elected, as follows."n If she read what "follows" carefully, she 
might wonder why the losing candidate for president does not 
routinely wind up as vice-president. If she thought some more 
and considered that the electors might cast their two votes for 
the president and vice-president running on a ticket together, 
she would then wonder why they do not routinely wind up with 
the same number of votes as each other, leaving it to the House 
of Representatives to decide which one of them would actually 
be president. If she were lucky, her copy of the Constitution 
would have some annotation indicating that she should check 
the Twelfth Amendment, where she would learn that she has 
wasted her time trying to interpret the Constitution. 
Under a Madisonian constitution, a citizen would not have 
to wade through such confusing surplusage and follow an unoffi-
cial cross-reference, but instead could learn how the president is 
elected by reading what "follows" the part of the Constitution 
that says that the president shall be elected "as follows." 
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: ELIMINATING EVIL 
PROVISIONS 
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. If it were 
integrated into the body of the Constitution, it would fit com-
fortably in the Madisonian bill of rights in Article I, section 9. 
Indeed, since the Thirteenth Amendment renders irrelevant the 
limitation on Congressional power over the slave trade con-
tained at the beginning of Article I, section 9, the language 
abolishing slavery can take the place of that evil provision. The 
result is that what earlier looked like an embarrassing way to 
begin a bill of rights would be eliminated, and the most basic 
76. Under neither system does the full electoral college ever meet to deliberate. 
Cf. Geoffrey R. Stone, et al., Constitutional Law 14 (Little, Brown and Co., 3d ed. 1996) 
("electoral college ... was to be a deliberative body"). 
77. U.S. Const., Art. II§ 1, cl. 1. 
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right-the right to be free from enslavement-would take its 
place, joining such rights as habeas corpus, free speech, free ex-
ercise of religion, protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the prohibition on bills of attainder. Under Madi-
son's approach to amendments, the limitation on the amend-
ment power to protect the slave trade, as well as the hated fugi-
tive slave clause of Article IV, section 2, would likewise be 
removed from the Constitution. 
Madison's approach to constitutional amendment would 
also have made it less likely that the framers of the Thirteenth 
Amendment would have overlooked that the abrogation of 
slavery, by permitting freed slaves to be counted for allocating 
seats in Congress and the Electoral College, increased the dan-
ger of southern dominance of the national government.78 "This 
oversight vastly complicated the already difficult task of Recon-
struction." 79 
Incorporating section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment into 
the body of the constitution would require an addition to Article 
I, section 8, which gives Congress the power to "make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution 
the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or in any De-
partment or Officer thereof."80 The addition would be a rather 
straightforward phrase at the end of the sentence: "and to en-
force the limitations and obligations imposed by this Constitu-
tion." This addition would simply state explicitly what the Su-
preme Court had already held to be implicit in the constitution 
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, where the Court held that if "the Con-
stitution guarantees the right ... the natural inference certainly 
is, that the national government is clothed with the appropriate 
authority and functions to enforce it. "81 The delicious irony is 
78. See William E. Nelson, The Founeenth Amendment 46 (Harvard U. Press, 
1988). 
79. ld; see also Rakove, Original Meanings at 93 (cited in note 1) (noting that "the 
South had to be reconstructed-precisely because freed but disenfranchised slaves 
would be fully counted for purposes of apportionment in the House"). 
80. U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. See Meltzer, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. at 22 (cited in 
note 69) ("Suppose that the Fourteenth Amendment had been interlineated in the origi-
nal ~nstitution-with ... Section 5's grant of legislative authority added to Article I, 
Section 8. "). 
81. 41 U.S. 539, 615 (1842). For a devastating critique of both Prigg and the at-
tempt by Justice Story's son to recast it as an anti-slavery opinion, see Paul Finkelman, 
Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's Ju-
dicial Nationalism, 1994 Sup. a. Rev. 247 (1995). 
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that the right involved in Prigg was the right of a slave owner to 
the return of his property under the fugitive slave clause. 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE 
UNION'S VICTORY IN THE CIVIL WAR AND REMOVING 
OUTDATED TRANSITIONAL MATERIAL 
The Fourteenth Amendment contains four substantive pro-
visions which serve to· embody in the Constitution the Union's 
victory in the Civil War. Section 1 defines both national and 
state citizenship and prohibits the states from infringing the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States and en-
sures that states provide both due process and equal protection. 
Section 2 revises the method of apportioning seats in the House 
of Representatives to eliminate the advantage originally given to 
slave holding states. Section 3 disables public officers who 
joined the confederate insurrection from holding future office. 
Section 4 makes clear that the debts incurred to suppress the 
confederacy would be paid, but that the debts of the confeder-
acy would not be paid and slave owners would not be compen-
sated for emancipation. 
It is possible that the Union's victory would have been em-
bodied in the Constitution much differently if the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment followed Madison's method of amend-
ing the constitution. Such a method might well have forced 
them to confront directly the question of which rights already 
protected from federal infringement, if any, they intended to 
also be protected from state infringement. This is not the place 
to revisit the debate over the incorporation doctrine,82 but rather 
simply to note that a Madisonian approach to constitutional 
amendment might have radically influenced that debate. For 
example, the Reconstruction Congress might have resolved the 
debate textually by moving elements of Article I, section 9 and 
Article I, section 10 into a new section that explicitly limited 
both the federal government and the states. More generally, it 
might have made it harder for the members of the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress to evade making clear just how substantially they in-
tended to alter the federal system.83 
82. See generally Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate 
the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949); William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fair-
man, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1954). 
83. See Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 52 (cited in note 77) (draftsmen of 
fourteenth amendment may have chosen "a phrasing that was sufficiently broad so that 
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In order to keep speculation to a minimum, however, I am 
willing to assume that the text of the four substantive provisions 
of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been enacted as they 
were, but located in the appropriate parts of the constitution. 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment contains 
two distinct sentences, one defining citizenship and the other 
protecting privileges and immunities, due process, and equal 
protection. The latter plainly belongs at the beginning of Article 
I, section 10, the section of the constitution setting forth limits 
on state power that has been called "the Federalist forebear of 
the Fourteenth Amendment."84 Indeed, Congressman Bing-
ham- "the Madison of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,"85 -explained that he used Article I, section 10 as 
a model for his drafting. 86 
The first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is more 
difficult to place, perhaps because it seems to have been some-
what of an afterthought in the amendment process. It was not a 
part of the proposed amendment as it emerged from the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction or as it was passed by the House 
of Representatives.87 Instead, it was added on the floor of the 
Senate pursuant to a motion of Senator Howard of Michigan.88 
Although many Republicans in Congress evidently believed that 
those who favored federal protection of political rights could construe it to provide such 
protection, and sufficiently innocuous so that those opposed giving such power to the 
federal government could be reassured that the amendment did no such thing."). 
84. Amar, 100 Yale L.J. at 1134 (cited in note 53). 
85. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). See also 
Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 343 (cited in note 2) ("we might do 
well to study John Bingham more, and lift some of the load from James Madison's 
stooped shoulders."). 
86. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., App. 1st Sess. 84 (1871) ("I did imitate the fram-
ers of the original Constitution. As they had said 'no State shall emit bills of credit, pass 
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts;' imi-
tating their example and imitating it to the letter, I prepared the provision of the first 
section of the fourteenth amendment .... "). 
87. See Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 57-58 (cited in note 78) (describing 
proposal by the joint committee and noting that it was passed by the House as pro-
posed); Horace Edgar Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 71 (AMS 
Press, 1965) ("at no time was the question of citizenship considered by the Committee, 
no proposition to define citizenship being submitted .... for the Committee evidently 
regarded the freedmen as citizens"); id. at 73 (noting that the report of the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction said "not a word ... about the necessity or desirability of de-
fining citizenship," but nonetheless "specifically declared that negroes were citizens."). 
88. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2869 (1866). Senator Fessenden, Chairman 
of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, was too ill to present the joint resolution 
proposing the fourteenth amendment, and Senator Howard took his place. Flack, The 
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment at 84 (cited in note 86). This amendment was 
made after the Republicans had spent several days in caucus, "while the Senate held 
short sessions or was in adjournment." Fairman, 2 Stan. L. Rev. at 59 (cited in note 81). 
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the freedmen had already been made citizens by the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, they feared that 
"Courts had thrown some doubt over the question," and might 
find the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional.89 Therefore 
they did not want to put "'reliance ... upon judicial decisions' 
which might be 'against freedom."' 90 The major judicial decision 
that had been against freedom, of course, was Scott v. Sand-
ford.91 
Dred Scott, like Chisolm v. Georgia,92 involved an interpre-
tation of one of Article III's diversity clauses: blacks were not 
"citizens" within the meaning of Article III and therefore could 
not invoke a federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Perhaps then, 
the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, designed as it 
was to prevent another Dred Scott, belongs, like the Eleventh 
Amendment, in Article III. 
On the other hand, Professor Nelson has stated: 
In all, the existing archival material suggests that, during the 
winter and spring and even into the autumn of 1866, questions 
connected with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
were the central political concern of the American people. 
Section one itself was not seen as a trivial matter designed 
merely to remove doubts about the constitutionality of the 
Civil Rights Act, but rather as a declaration of fundamental 
principle .... As a declaration of fundamental principle-of 
the meaning of American citizenship and nationality-section 
one was in the center of public discourse.93 
89. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment at 88 (cited in note 86) 
(citing Cong. Globe at 2560). See also Crosskey, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 20-21 (cited in 
note 81) (arguing that Bingham "drew the first draft of what is now the first section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the assumption that all the Republican constitutional 
theories ... were the standing law [and] failed to recognize that prudent draftsmanship 
required a negation of the still unoverruled doctrine of the Dred Scott Case that persons 
of African descent, whether slaves or not, were not, and could not possibly be, citizens of 
the United States under the Constitution."). Cf. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
73 (1873) ("But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Sc.-Jtt case ... that 
a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a 
State or of the United States. This decision, while it met the condemnation of some of 
the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been over-
ruled."). 
90. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 58 (cited in note 77) (quoting "Report 
of the Reconstruction Committee," The Right Way at 1 (May 12, 1866)). 
91. 60 u.s. 393 (1857). 
92. 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (holding that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the 
case as a controversy "between a State and Citizens of another State"). 
93. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment at 60 (cited in note 77). 
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As a declaration of fundamental principle of citizenship and 
nationality, the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would be best placed in Article IV, section 2, with the original 
privileges and immunities clause. This is a particularly apt 
placement, considering that nearly all of the Civil War era Re-
publicans believed that the original privileges and immunities 
clause, properly understood, already yrotected the privileges 
and immunities of national citizenship. 
Notice that if the privileges or immunities clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were placed in Article I, section 10, it 
would follow close on the heels of the Madisonian bill of rights 
in Article I, section 9, a placement that might have added cre-
dence to the argument that the privileges and immunities of na-
tional citizenship are those listed in the bill of rights,95 particu-
larly because such a bill of rights would not include civil jury 
trial or grand jury indictment.96 Moreover, by separating the 
first and second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
94. Crosskey, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 15-16 (cited in note 82); Amar, Bill of Rights: 
Creation and Reconstruction at 207-08 (cited in note 2) (noting the '"widely held Repub-
lican view that these words in Article IV incorporated by reference the rights, freedoms, 
privileges, and immunities later specified in the Federal Bill."). Indeed, a Madisonian 
approach to the fourteenth amendment might have led Bingham to amend Article IV's 
privileges and immunities clause to fill what he saw as an ellipsis. See Crosskey, 22 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. at 13 (cited in note 82) ("There is an ellipsis in the language employed in 
the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is 'the privileges and immunities 
of citizens of the United States in the several States' that it guaranties.") (quoting Cong. 
Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Bingham)). 
95. But see Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 74-75 (noting that the first sentence of the 
fourteenth amendment refers to both national and state citizenship, while the second 
sentence refers only to national citizenship, and holding that the fourteenth amendment 
only protects privileges and immunities of national citizenship, not privileges and immu-
nities of state citizenship); id. at 79 (suggesting that privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship are limited to those that "own their existence to the Federal government, its 
National character, its Constitution, or its laws."); cf. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 71-72 (1947) 
(Black, J., dissenting) ("My study of the historical events that culminated in the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who ... opposed its submission and 
passage, persuades me that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amend-
ment's first section, separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to 
make the Bill of Rights, applicable to the states."); Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction at 260 (cited in note 2) (arguing that the right question under the privi-
leges or immunities clause is '"whether it is a personal privilege-that is, a private 
right-of individual citizens, rather than of states or the public at large."). 
96. Cf. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("To suggest that 
it is inconsistent with a truly free society to begin prosecutions without an indictment, to 
try petty civil cases without the paraphernalia of a common law jury ... is, in de 
Tocqueville's phrase, to confound the familiar with the necessary."}. Perhaps Akhil 
Amar is correct that there are stronger arguments for applying the civil jury and grand 
jury requirements than generally acknowledged, see Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction at 318-26 (cited in note 2); yet he acknowledges that "so much of the hos-
tility to incorporation has been driven by doubts about the fundamentality of juries." Id. 
at 326. 
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each other- and by linking the definition of citizenship with the 
original privileges and immunities clause-it would reduce the 
force of the Court's reasoning in Slaughterhouse that the privi-
leges and immunities of state and national citizenship must be 
different because the first sentence mentions both while the sec-
ond sentence mentions only national citizenship. 97 In short, the 
incorporation debate might have been short-circuited-and the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
saved from the virtual irrelevance to which Slaughterhouse con-
signed it-because the privileges or immunities clause in Article 
I, section 10 of a Madisonian constitution might have been read 
as a reference to the bill of rights in Article I, section 9 of a 
Madisonian constitution. 
The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
addresses the allocation of seats in the House of Representa-
tives, would replace the original method of allocation contained 
in the third paragraph of Article I, section 2. As a result, a pro-
vision that gave slave-holding states disproportionate power in 
the House and the Electoral College by adding three-fifths of 
the number of slaves to a state's free population would be re-
placed by a provision that reduces a state's representation in the 
House to the extent the state excludes adult black males from 
voting in elections. Moreover, it seems likely that the transi-
tional material in that paragraph-requiring that the first census 
occur within three years after the first meeting of Congress and 
allocating representatives to the original states pending that cen-
sus-would also be eliminated. If a paragraph is being substan-
tially rewritten, a drafter following Madison's approach would 
probably delete old transitional provisions that had long since 
been implemented and rendered no longer relevant.98 
97. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 74-75. 
98. The provision that direct taxes, like representation, be apportioned, would also 
likely have been eliminated from Article I, section 2, because its protection was re-
peated later in Article I, section 9. It is also possible that the provision in Article I, sec-
tion 9 would itself have been deleted as well, considering that the requirement of appor-
tioning direct taxes had been created solely as a device to legitimate the apportionment 
of representation. See Rakove, Original Meanings at 74 (cited in note 1) ("As Wilson 
noted, 'less umbrage would perhaps be taken agst. an admission of slaves into the Rule 
of representation' if it posed as an extension of a rule of taxation.") (citation omitted); 
id. at 179-80 (noting that "real purpose" of apportionment rule was "to legitimate the 
sectional compromise over representation."); id. at 396 n.44 (recounting that Gouver-
neur Morris suggested that the Convention strike out the provision proportioning taxa-
tion to population because it had been merely a bridge to get over the problem of how 
to count slaves and that once across, they could remove the bridge.). Interestingly, if 
this had been done, the sixteenth amendment would have been unnecessary. 
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For similar reasons, a Madisonian approach to the Four-
teenth Amendment might well have resulted in the elimination 
of Article VII of the constitution, which provides that the ratifi-
cation of the constitution by nine states would establish the con-
stitution between those states. Certainly this provision was a 
transitional one that had been fulfilled. Moreover, there might 
have been some symbolic appeal to the idea of eliminating this 
transitional provision, having just fought a civil war that estab-
lished the permanence of the Union.99 
The third section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that a public officer who once took an oath of office to support 
the Constitution, and then violated that oath by supporting the 
confederacy, could not hold either state or federal office unless 
Congress by a two-thirds vote removed the disability. The natu-
ral place for insertion of this provision is in Article VI, immedi-
ately after the requirement that state and federal officers take 
an oath to support the Constitution. 
The fourth section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that the debts incurred by the United States to suppress the con-
federacy would be paid, but that no compensation would be paid 
to slave owners for the loss or emancipation of any slave and 
that neither the United States nor any state could pay debts of 
the confederacy. It, too, has a natural insertion point in Article 
VI, immediately after the provision that the prior debts incurred 
by the United States would be as valid under the Constitution as 
under the Articles of Confederation. 
But what of section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, giving 
Congress the power to enforce the substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? While section 5 has caused consider-
able controversy in the Supreme Court,100 it would have been 
99. The legal theory of secession relied heavily on the idea that the constitution 
was "formed by the several States in their separate sovereign capacity." Mississippi 
Resolution on Secession (Nov. 30, 1860), reprinted in Henry Steele Comager, ed., 
Documents of American History 371 (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 8th ed. 1968). South 
Carolina, for example, purported to "repeal[]" its ratification, South Carolina Ordinance 
of Succession (Dec. 20, 1860), reprinted in Documents of American History at 372, ex-
plaining that the constitution was a "compact between the States." South Carolina Dec-
laration of Causes of Secession (Dec. 24, 1860), reprinted in Documents of American 
History at 373. In the special session of the Confederate Congress in which President 
Jefferson Davis asked for and received authority to prosecute the war, he explained that 
"the Constitution of the United States was framed in 1787 and submitted to the several 
states for ratification, as shown by the seventh article," which he then proceeded to 
quote. Davis's Message to Congress (April 29, 1861), reprinted in Documents of Ameri-
can History at 389 (emphasis in original). 
100. Compare City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997) (exercise of 
Congressional power under section 5 requires "congruence and proportionality between 
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completely unnecessary if Madison's approach to constitutional 
amendments had been adopted. For as we have already seen,101 
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment would already 
have resulted in the revision of the necessary and proper clause 
to explicitly give Congress the power to "enforce the limitations 
and obligations imposed by this Constitution." Although there 
might still have been battles over the scope of Congressional 
enforcement power, they would be fou~ht on the familiar terrain 
of the necessary and proper clause, 02 rather than on some 
unique and exotic constitutional island. 
THE FIFTEENTH, NINETEENTH, TWENTY-FOURTH, AND 
TWENTY-SIXTH AMENDMENTS: GIVING SHAPE TO THE 
GUARANTY OF A REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 
The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-
Sixth Amendments each expand the franchise by eliminating a 
traditional basis for denying people the ability to participate in 
political life: race, sex, poverty, and youth. They belong to-
gether, and a Madisonian approach to the process of constitu-
tional amendment would put them together. Moreover, by set-
ting limits on exclusion from political participation, they help to 
define what a truly representative government entails. Thus all 
four should be placed at the end of Article IV, section 4, which 
guarantees to every state a "republican form of government." 
It is also possible that a Madisonian approach to constitu-
tional amendment might have led Congress to consider, when 
proposing the Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments, whether to provide for reduction in a state's rep-
resentation in the House if the state does not permit women or 
the poor or eighteen year olds to vote. Alternatively, Congress 
might have considered deleting the existing provision calling for 
reduction in representation as unnecessary after the Fifteenth 
Amendment. 103 As our constitution now stands, discrimination 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end") with 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651-52 n.10 (1966) (suggesting that under section 5 
Congress can expand, but not contract, individual rights recognized by the Supreme 
Court). 
101. See text accompanying notes 77-80. 
102. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413 (1819) (holding that "necessary" 
in the "necessary and proper" clause means "convenient" or "useful"); cf. Eugene 
Gressman and Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise Clause, 51 
Ohio St. L.J. 65, 125 (1996) (describing section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
"little necessary and proper clause"). 
103. Such a deletion would have removed a textual obstacle to redressing sex dis-
crimination under the equal protection clause. See Stone, et at., Constitutional Law at 
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in voting against all these groups is illegal, but only discrimina-
tion against males over twenty-one triggers a reduction in repre-
sentation in the House. 
THE SIXTEENTH AMENDMENT: LOOSENING A RESTRAINT ON 
CONGRESS 
Article I, section 9 prohibited Congress from imposing a di-
rect tax, except in proportion to the population of each state, 
creating serious impediments to a national income tax.104 
Moreover, Article V prohibited an amendment of this provision 
prior to 1808. As noted earlier, these provisions were included 
in the original constitution to provide cover for the three-fifths 
rule of representation, and might have been eliminated by the 
Reconstruction Congress under a Madisonian approach to con-
stitutional amendment.105 Under our Shermanesque constitu-
tion, however, this did not occur. In order to permit a national 
income tax, the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted in 1913. 
Even if these provisions had survived Reconstruction, a 
Madisonian would not put pages of text between a provision 
placing a restraint on Congress and another provision loosening 
that restraint. Instead, the Sixteenth Amendment would be 
placed in Article I, section 9, as a modification of the restraint 
on Congressional powers that was being loosened. In addition, 
under Madison's approach to constitutional amendment, the ex-
pired restriction on amending this provision would have been 
deleted. 
THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: ELIMINATING MORE 
CONFUSING SURPLUSAGE 
The Seventeenth Amendment is much like the twelfth. Just 
as the twelfth changed the method of presidential election from 
that described in Article II, section 1, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment changed the method of electing Senators from that de-
scribed in Article I, section 3. Under the original Constitution, 
Senators were chosen by state legislatures and the governor 
could fill temporary vacancies until the legislature met. Under 
the Seventeenth Amendment, Senators are elected by the peo-
709 (cited in note 75) ("Ironically the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment for 
the first time introduced explicit gender discrimination into the Constitution."); Minor v. 
Happerset, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (relying on section two of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
uphold the denial offemale suffrage). 
104. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
105. See note 107. 
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ple of each state and the governor can be empowered to fill 
temporary vacancies until an election can be held. Following 
Madison's approach to the amending the Constitution, just as 
the Twelfth Amendment would replace the parts of Article II, 
section 1 that it superseded, so too the Seventeenth Amendment 
would replace the parts of Article I, section 3 that it superseded. 
Moreover, the provision of Article I, section 4 that prohibited 
Congress from setting the place for choosing Senators would be 
eliminated. 
In addition, as with the Fourteenth Amendment, outdated 
transitional material might well have been eliminated, in this 
case the provision of Article I, section 3 that the first Senate di-
vide itself into three classes so that only one-third of the Senate 
stands for reelection every two years. Finally, the transitional 
material contained in the Seventeenth Amendment itself-i.e., 
that it would not affect Senators already chosen prior to its rati-
fication-could simply have been a part of the resolution of 
amendment. Under a Madisonian approach, such a provision 
need not be contained in the Constitution itself, any more than 
the resolution of the Constitutional Convention calling on Con-
gress, as soon as nine states ratified, to set dates for the selection 
of electors, the voting by electors, and the "Time and Place for 
commencing the Proceedin1s under this Constitution," was con-
tained in the Constitution.1 
THE EIGHTEENTH AND TwENTY-FIRST AMENDMENTS: 
A VOIDING THE CLUTTER OF ENACTMENT AND REPEAL 
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited intoxicating liquor; 
the Twenty-First Amendment repealed the Eighteenth 
Amendment. While thankfully this is the only such event in our 
history, it could have happened more frequently, and might still. 
Madison's approach to constitutional amendment would avoid 
cluttering the Constitution with amendments and their repeals. 
Instead, upon repeal, the earlier amendment would simply be 
stricken out. 
106. Resolution of the Constitutional Convention, Sept. 17, 1787, reprinted in Bern-
stein, Amending America at 291 (cited in note 56). Similarly, the Congressional resolu-
tion transmitting the proposed constitution to the state legislatures "in Order to be sub-
mitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in each State by the people thereof' is not 
treated as part of the constitution. Resolution of the Congress of the United States to 
Transmit the Proposed Constitution to the Legislatures of the States, Sept. 28, 1787, re-
printed in 2 Documentary History of the Constitution of the United States of America 
1786-1870 at 22 (Dept. of State, 1894). 
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The Twenty-First Amendment, however, did one thing in 
addition to repealing the Eighteenth Amendment. It prohibited 
bringing intoxicating liquor into a state for delivery or use in 
violation of the laws of that state. This short provision is the 
only part of these two amendments that would appear in a 
Madisonian constitution. 
As Laurence Tribe has pointed out, the Twenty-First 
Amendment "actually forbids the private conduct it identifies, 
rather than conferring power on the States as such" to forbid 
that conduct.107 This feature makes placement of the provision 
in a Madisonian constitution a bit unclear, because our Constitu-
tion does not have a section devoted to imposing restrictions on 
individuals. The only other such constitutional provision is the 
Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery, but a ban on bringing 
alcohol into a state hardly seems to belong alongside the aboli-
tion of slavery.108 The better place for this short provision from 
107. Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Les-
sons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 Const. 
Comm. 217, 219 (1995) ("This has the singular effect of putting the Twenty-First 
Amendment on a pedestal most observers have always assumed was reserved for the 
rather more august Thirteenth Amendment, which is typically described as the only ex-
ception to the principle that our Constitution's provisions ... limit only some appropri-
ate level of government.") (emphasis in original). 
108. ld. at 220 ("The upshot is that there are two ways, and only two ways, in which 
an ordinary private citizen ... can violate the United States Constitution. One is to en-
slave someone, a suitably hellish act. The other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or 
bourbon into a State in violation of its beverage control laws-an act that might have 
been thought juvenile, and perhaps even lawless, but unconstitutional?") (emphasis in 
original). 
The eighteenth amendment itself directly controlled private behavior. U.S. Const., 
Amend. XVIII § 1 ("the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors ... 
is hereby prohibited."); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350,386 (1920) (noting that 
the amendment "binds all legislative bodies, courts, public officers and individuals") 
(emphasis added). Indeed, Elihu Root argued that such an amendment was beyond the 
scope of the Article V amendment power, see National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. at 
362-64 (argument of Senator Root). He distinguished the thirteenth amendment by 
noting that slavery is a creature of positive law, "always unauthorized unless some exer-
cise of government permitted it." ld. at 363. The Supreme Court held otherwise, but 
announced only its conclusions, not its reasons. !d. at 384-86 ("Mr. Justice Van Devan-
ter announced the conclusions of the court."); see also David E. Kyvig, Repealing Na-
tional Prohibition 17-18 (U. of Chicago Press, 1979). A related argument, that an 
amendment such as prohibition could only be enacted by convention, was accepted by a 
district judge in Newark, N.J., but not by the Supreme Court. United States v. Sprague, 
44 F.2d 967 (D.N.J. 1930), rev'd 282 U.S. 716 (1931); see Kyvig, Repealing National 
Prohibition at 139. While the twenty-first amendment does not belong alongside the 
abolition of slavery, it is at least possible that the advocates of the eighteenth amend-
ment-led by "evangelical Protestant churches" that believed that sobriety was "the 
foundation of economic success and political liberty," id. at 6-would have sought to 
place the eighteenth amendment precisely there. 
The twenty-first amendment was ratified by conventions, thus belying the statement 
in our Shermanesque Constitution that describes all of the amendments as ratified by 
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the Twenty-First Amendment is in Article IV, section 2, along 
with the other constitutional provisions dealing with those who 
cross from the border from one state to another. 109 
THE TWENTIETH, TWENTY -SECOND, TWENTY-THIRD, AND 
TWENTY-FIITH AMENDMENTS: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT AND 
CONGRESS IN THEIR PLACES 
The Twentieth Amendment, designed to eliminated lame 
duck sessions of Congress, sets January 3 as the date for the 
transition of power from one Congress to the next and January 
20 as the date for the transition of power from one president to 
the next. It also provides for situations in which the president-
elect dies prior to taking office. The Twenty-Second Amend-
ment imposes a limit of two terms on the president. The 
Twenty-Third Amendment provides for the District of Colum-
bia to participate in the election of the president through the 
electoral college. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for 
filling a vacancy in the vice presidency and for handling presi-
dential disability. 
If Madison's approach to amending the constitution had 
prevailed, the provisions of the Twentieth Amendment would 
have been placed in Article I, section 4, replacing the second 
paragraph of that article which required Congress to assemble 
(typically some thirteen months after they were elected110) on 
the first Monday in December. The remaining substantive pro-
visions of the Twentieth Amendment, as well as the substantive 
provisions of the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-
Fifth Amendments, would all be placed in Article II, section 1, 
along with all of the other provisions governing the election of 
the president. 
A Madisonian approach to constitutional amendments, 
however, might well have been more valuable: The drafters of 
the Twentieth Amendment wanted to ensure that if any future 
presidential election had to be resolved by the House, it would 
be done by the new House taking office on January 3, not the 
the state legislatures. 
109. The privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, section 2 protects a citizen 
of one state that travels into another while its extradition clause prevents a person who 
travels from one state into another to avoid prosecution from obtaining sanctuary. See 
U.S. Const., Art. IV,§ 2. 
110. See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L Rev. 
470,485 (1997). 
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old House before January 3.111 However, they did nothing to set 
a date on which the president of the Senate is required by Arti-
cle II, section 1 and the Twelfth Amendment to open the votes 
submitted by the electors in the several states. Nor did they al-
ter the requirement of those provisions that, if no one receives a 
majority of electoral votes, the House of Representatives shall 
choose a president "immediately." There is a ticking time bomb 
in our Constitution, one that could produce a crisis of legitimacy 
if an outgoing Congress claimed the power- perhaps even the 
constitutional duty- to meet prior to January 3 in order to select 
the new president. 112 If Madison's approach to constitutional 
amendment had prevailed, the drafters of the Twentieth 
Amendment might well have focused more closely on how they 
intended to affect the prior language of the Constitution, and 
perhaps have avoided this danger. 
THE TwENTY -SEVENTH AMENDMENT: FULL CIRCLE TO 
MADISON 
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which prevents Con-
gress from taking advantage of a raise that it gives itself without 
standing before the people in an intervening election, brings us 
full circle back to James Madison. For this amendment was one 
of the original amendments proposed by Madison, approved by 
Congress, but not ratified by the requisite number of states until 
1992. It is easy to decide where it would be inserted into the 
constitution under Madison's approach, because Madison him-
self proposed that it be inserted at "the end of the first sen-
tence" in "Article I[], section 6, clause 1. " 113 
III. A UNIFORM AND ENTIRE CONSTITUTION 
What follows is what our Constitution would look like if 
Madison's approach to constitutional amendments had pre-
vailed in the first Congress. For ease in finding additions to the 
original text, the additions are highlighted; for ease in reading, 
the deletions are not indicated. The result, I believe, is as Madi-
111. ld. at 481 & n.54. 
112. Cf. Akhil Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitu-
tion's Succession Gap, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 215 , 222 (1994) (unresolved questions of what 
happens if death occurs at any time prior to counting of electoral votes create "a time 
bomb ticking away in our Constitution"). 
113. Madison Resolution of June 8, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record at 12 
(cited in note 1). 
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son predicted, "uniform and entire," and "certainly ... more 
simple. "114 
It is true that such a uniform and entire Constitution lacks 
the "archeological feel," caused by "different historical layers of 
text. "115 As a result, the scars of history are less immediately 
visible. But a constitution is not written for historians or arche-
ologists. It is written as a frame of government for the people of 
today. As Judge Gibbons has explained: 
But who elected the Founders? The answer to that question 
is plain: we did, if anyone did, and each prior generation has 
before us, and if the Constitution is to remain a form of higher 
law, each succeeding generation must do so again-for no one 
else can. 116 
Because "the status of the Constitution as law depends 
upon the political will of a present political community,"117 it 
should be understandable, not only by the priestly class of law-
yers and judges, but by the people-today's people-in whose 
name it is made.118 The Constitution "was not supposed to be a 
114. The Congressional Register, Aug. 13, 1789, reprinted in Documentary Record 
at 118 (cited in note 1). 
115. Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 344 (cited in note 2). 
116. John J. Gibbons, lntentionalism, History, and Legitimacy, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
613,624 (1991). See also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 433, 438 (1986) (arguing that "Justices 
read the Constitution in the only way we can: as twentieth-century Americans."). 
117. Gibbons, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 622 (cited in note 116). 
118. See, e.g., Rakove, Original Meanings at 344 (cited in note 1) ("Had the Consti-
tution ... been expressed in the scientific language of law, or those terms of art which 
we often find in political compositions, ... it might have appeared more definite and less 
ambiguous; but to the great body of the people altogether obscure, and to accept it they 
must leap in the dark.") (quoting Oliver Ellsworth). Cf. Kyvig, Explicit and Authentic 
Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995 at 102 (cited in note 24) ("The decision 
to make amendments supplementary increased the need for an arbiter of disputes over 
constitutional interpretation. The role of the judiciary in American constitutionalism 
would therefore grow larger."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the 
Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-
Third Century, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 671, 674-75 (1995) ("the words of the Constitution, our 
fundamental charter of rights and of government, have become the exclusive province of 
an elite cabal of high priests .... The Constitution has become a relic to be worshiped, 
rather than a document of the People, intended to be read, understood, and applied by 
the People, in order to produce government for the People. We don't bury the docu-
ment in a treasure chest, but we do the next best thing: we place it under glass at the Na-
tional Archives so that tourists can walk past and gaze at old parchment for twenty sec-
onds apiece."). Interestingly, the veneration for the original parchment of the 
constitution is a relatively recent phenomenon. As late as 1882, it was "kept folded up 
in a little tin box in the lower part of a closet" at the library of the State Department. 
Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution at v (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1993 re-
print) (internal citation omitted). 
Joseph Goldstein has made a similar point about Supreme Court opinions: 
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prolix code. It had been made, and could be unmade at will, by 
We the People of the United States."119 Indeed, if Madison had 
prevailed, perhaps we would have been less likely to have "lost 
the powerful and prevailing sense of 200 years ago that the Con-
stitution was the people's law."120 Such popular understanding is 
particularly important for a bill of rights, considering that for 
Madison, "The true benefits of a bill of rights were to be found 
in the realm of public opinion. . . . As greater popular respect 
for individual and minority rights developed over time ... the 
greater benefit would occur if acceptance of the principles en-
coded in rights acted to restrain political behavior, tempering 
improper poRular desires before they took the form of unjust 
legislation." 1 
There is, finally, an elegant symmetry to such a Madisonian 
constitution: It begins with a statement that it is made by "we 
the people," and ends with a recognition of the reserved powers 
of "the people." 122 
If Ours is to be an ''intelligent democracy," if Our revolutions are to be peace-
ful, We the People ... must be able to learn, from Our own reading of the Con-
stitution and the Supreme Court's constructions of it, what rights We have and 
do not have, ... and what limits are and are not imposed on those who govern 
on Our behalf. For then We can meet Our responsibility as informed citizens 
to respond to what the Court did and why it did it. 
Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court's Obligation to 
Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People Can Understand 6 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1992). 
119. Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction at 123 (cited in note 2). 
120. Amar, 100 Yale L.J. at 1195 (cited in note 53) (emphasis in original). 
121. Rakove, Original Meanings at 335-36 (cited in note 1). Anti-Federalists agreed 
that "[b]ills of rights were educational documents," but emphasized that "they provided 
the standards of certainty that enabled citizens to assess doubtful acts of government" 
and "worked best by inculcating the values they espoused among the people and their 
rulers." Id. at 324 (emphasis in original). See also Amar, Bill of Rights: Creation and 
Reconstruction at 157 (cited in note 2) ("The words of the Bill of Rights would them-
selves educate Americans; hence the appropriateness of didactic, nonlegalistic 
phrases .... "); id at 349 (noting that both James Madison and John Bingham under-
stood "that a Bill that did not dwell in the hearts and minds of ordinary Americans 
would probably, in the long run, fail."). 
122 Cf. Amar, 100 Yale L.J. at 1200 (cited in note 53) (preamble and tenth 
amendments are "perfect bookends, fittingly the alpha and omega"). 
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MADISON'S "UNIFORM AND ENTIRE" CONSTITUTION 
W e the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, in-sure domestic Tranquility, provide for the com-
mon defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the 
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain 
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
Article I 
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of 
a Senate and House of Representatives. 
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be com-
posed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of 
the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the 
Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous 
Branch of the State Legislature. 
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have at-
tained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be 
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers, counting the 
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed. The actual Enumeration shall be made within every 
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as Congress shall by Law di-
rect. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for 
every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one 
Representative. But when the right to vote at any election for 
the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, 
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in re-
bellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall 
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
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When vacancies happen in the Representation from any 
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Elec-
tion to fill such Vacancies. 
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker 
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeach-
ment. 
Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people 
thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. 
The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requi-
site for electors of the most numerous branch of the State leg-
islatures. 
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State 
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue 
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the leg-
islature of any State may empower the executive thereof to 
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacan-
cies by election as the legislature may direct. 
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to 
the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the 
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant 
of that State for which he shall be chosen. 
The Vice President of the United States shall be President 
of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally di-
vided. 
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a 
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or 
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United 
States. 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or 
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, 
the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted 
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and 
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, ac-
cording to Law. 
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Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at 
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. 
The terms of Senators and Representatives shall end at 
noon on the 3d day of January and the terms of their successors 
shall then begin. The Congress shall assemble at least once in 
every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day 
of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. 
Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority 
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller 
Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to 
compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, 
and under such Penalties as each House may provide. 
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, 
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. 
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and 
from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may 
in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the 
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of 
one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal. 
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, with-
out the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, 
nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall 
be sitting. 
Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a 
Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and 
paid out of the Treasury of the United States. But no law, 
varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and 
Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Repre-
sentatives shall have intervened. The members shall in all 
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be 
privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of 
their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the 
same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall 
not be questioned in any other Place. 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, 
or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during 
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such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continu-
ance in Office. 
Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in 
the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or 
concur with Amendments as on other Bills. 
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be pre-
sented to the President of the United States; If he approve he 
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to 
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the 
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider 
it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall 
agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objec-
tions, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsid-
ered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall be-
come a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses 
shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the 
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the 
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be re-
turned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) af-
ter it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, 
in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by 
their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not 
be a Law. 
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concur-
rence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be nec-
essary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented 
to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall 
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by 
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations pre-
scribed in the Case of a Bill. 
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power 
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to 
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States; 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
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To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the 
United States; 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign 
Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securi-
ties and current Coin of the United States; 
To establish Post Offices and post Roads; 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries; 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on 
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and 
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the 
land and naval Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws 
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Mi-
litia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in 
the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respec-
tively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress; 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, 
over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by 
Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, 
become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to 
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent 
of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for 
the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and 
other needful Buildings;-And 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the 
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United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof, and to 
enforce the limitations and obligations imposed by this Con-
stitution. 
Section 9. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any 
place subject to their jurisdiction. 
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it. 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any 
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, 
but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
No person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtain-
ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence. 
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The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people. 
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. 
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before di-
rected to be taken, but the Congress shall have power to lay 
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, 
without apportionment among the several States, and without 
regard to any census or enumeration. 
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any 
State. 
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of an-
other: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged 
to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another. 
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all pub-
lic Money shall be published from time to time. 
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any 
present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince, or foreign State. 
Section 10. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confed-
eration; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit 
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Ten-
der in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post 
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or 
grant any Title of Nobility. 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any 
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the 
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Im-
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ports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the 
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision 
and Controul of the Congress. 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any 
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of 
Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another 
State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually 
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 
Article II 
Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office 
during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice 
President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may 
be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, 
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United 
States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
The District constituting the seat of Government of the 
United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress 
may direct a number of electors of President and Vice Presi-
dent equal to the whole number of Senators and Representa-
tives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it 
were a State, but in no event more than the least populous 
State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the 
States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the 
election of President and Vice President, to be electors ap-
pointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District to per-
form their duties. 
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Elec-
tors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which 
Day shall be the same throughout the United States. 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with them-
selves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as 
President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
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Vice-President, and of the number ofvotesfor each, which lists 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of 
the government of the United States, directed to the President 
of the Senate;- The President of the Senate shall, in the pres-
ence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;- The person 
having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the 
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of 
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then 
from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding 
three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of 
Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the Presi-
dent. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by 
states, the representation from each state having one vote; a 
quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members 
from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states 
shall be necessary to a choice. -The person having the greatest 
number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, 
if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two 
highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the 
Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-
thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person 
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be 
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. 
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death 
of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives 
may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have 
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the 
persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President 
whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them. 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, 
shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Per-
son be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the 
Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident 
within the United States. 
No person shall be elected to the office of the President 
more than twice, and no person who has held the office of 
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a 
term to which some other person was elected President shall be 
elected to the office of the President more than once. 
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The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at 
noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of their succes-
sors shall then begin. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of 
the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, 
the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President 
shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the begin-
ning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to 
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President un-
til a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by 
law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a 
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall 
then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act 
shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a 
President or Vice President shall have qualified 
In case of the removal of the President from office or of 
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become 
President. 
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice 
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who 
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both 
Houses of Congress. 
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to 
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and 
duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting 
President. 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other 
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the Presi-
dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties 
of the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of 
the executive department or of such other body as Congress 
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may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. There-
upon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Con-
gress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written 
declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one 
days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by 
two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President 
shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; oth-
erwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his 
office. 
Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice 
President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and 
such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be re-
moved, or a President shall be elected. 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Serv-
ices, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor di-
minished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, 
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolu-
ment from the United States, or any of them. 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall 
take the following Oath or Affirmation:- "I do solemnly swear 
(or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President 
of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." 
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of 
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the 
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon 
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, 
and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Of-
fenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeach-
ment. 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
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other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Ap-
pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest 
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, 
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments. 
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that 
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Com-
missions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. 
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress 
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their 
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and 
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement be-
tween them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may 
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall re-
ceive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission 
all the Officers of the United States. 
Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
Article III 
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The 
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their 
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be di-
minished during their Continuance in Office. 
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls;- to all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more 
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State, where 
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the State is plaintiff;-between Citizens of different States;-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects, except where a State is 
sued by a citizen or subject of any foreign state. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the su-
preme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other 
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachments, 
and cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger, shall 
be by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and no person shall be held 
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; provided that 
when the crime is not committed within any State, the Trial 
shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law 
have directed. 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reex-
amined in any Court of the United States, than according to 
the rules of the common law. 
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist 
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Ene-
mies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be con-
victed of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to 
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. 
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment 
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption 
of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person at-
tainted. 
1998] MADISON'S "UNIFORM" CONSTITUTION 297 
Article IV 
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State 
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
Section 2. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. The Citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States. 
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in an-
other State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the 
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the 
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. 
The transportation or importation into any State, Terri-
tory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use 
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, 
is hereby prohibited 
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress 
into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected 
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be 
formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, 
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned 
as well as of the Congress. 
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other 
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this 
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of 
the United States, or of any particular State. 
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State 
in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall pro-
tect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence. 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any 
primary or other election for President or Vice President, for 
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electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Rep-
resentative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the 
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll 
tax or other tax. 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex. 
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen 
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of age. 
Article V 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall 
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitu-
tion, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of 
the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing 
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents 
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conven-
tions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no 
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage 
in the Senate. 
Article VI 
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before 
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the 
United States under this Constitution, as under the Confedera-
tion. The validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection 
or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United 
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal 
and void. 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
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State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and 
the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive 
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the sev-
eral States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support 
this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as 
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Con-
gress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any 
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of 
Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member 
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of 
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insu"ection or rebellion against the 
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Con-
gress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Article VII 
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people. 
